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Abstract. Tamper-proof devices are pretty powerful. They can be used to have
better security in applications. In this work we observe that they can also be ma-
liciously used in order to defeat some common privacy protection mechanisms.
We propose the theoretical model of trusted agent to formalize the notion of pro-
grammable secure hardware. We show that protocols not using tamper-proof de-
vices are not deniable if malicious verifiers can use trusted agents. In a strong key
registration model, deniability can be restored, but only at the price of using key
escrow. As an application, we show how to break invisibility in undeniable signa-
tures, how to sell votes in voting schemes, how to break anonymity in group/ring
signatures, and how to carry on the Mafia fraud in non-transferable protocols.
We conclude by observing that the ability to put boundaries in computing de-
vices prevents from providing full control on how private information spreads:
the concept of sealing a device is in some sense incompatible with privacy.
1 Introduction
Tamper-proof hardware devices have been used quite massively in industrial and com-
mercial applications. There exists a wide spectrum of tamper-proof devices, ranging in
their price and security, from simple smartcards to the IBM 4758, which has several
physical penetration sensors, including temperature, radiation, pressure, etc. Clearly,
people are currently surrounded by devices (aimed at) instantiating trusted agents. Peo-
ple wear smart cards, secure tokens, their PCs have Trusted Computing Platforms, their
media readers have secure hardware to deal with DRMs, their iPhones have a self-
blocking secure hardware, passports have secure RFID tags, etc.
So far, secure hardware devices have been used to implement some strong security
protocols with the hypothesis that they are tamper-resistant. The idea of using tamper-
proof devices to realize cryptographic functionalities goes back (at least) to 1986 [10].
Due to existence of all side channel attacks, whether tamper resistance is possible in
practice is still an open question. Current allegedly tamper-resistant devices are (at least)
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trusted by banks, mobile telephone operators, companies selling access control devices,
software companies, media content providers, hardware manufacturers, governments,
and so on. It is unlikely that none of these organizations would ever try to take any
malicious advantage out from their devices. So, assuming some adversaries would use
tamper-proof devices for attacks is a legitimate assumption. In this paper we show how
to make several privacy attacks using trusted tamper-proof devices.
In this work, we formalize the notion of programmable secure hardware by intro-
ducing the trusted agent model. Informally speaking, the trusted agent model consists
in assuming that it is possible to acquire a trusted device (agent) that runs honestly a
known program in a secure environment (tamper proof) without any way of running an-
other program. At the first time it is switched on, we can load a code whose digest will
be permanently displayed. Later, we can interact with the device through the interface
defined by this program only. Quite importantly, every output will be appended to the
digest of the original program so that someone looking at the display is ensured that the
output is produced by a device having been set up with a program of displayed digest.
We show that within this model, it is possible
– to transfer proofs of zero-knowledge protocols after completion (in particular: to
transfer the verification of an invisible signature);
– to register rogue public keys and prove the ignorance of a secret key (which then can
be used to break anonymity in ring signatures or non-transferability mechanisms);
– to sell ballots in e-voting systems.
In a nutshell, for any interactive proof protocol, we can load the verifier algorithm in a
trusted agent and make a malicious verifier relay protocol messages between the prover
and the trusted agent. Afterward completion, the agent ends up in a state which tes-
tifies that the proof protocol was correctly run and provide some kind of forensic ev-
idence. Clearly, such a honest device could be used to defeat the invisible signature
paradigm [6] when maliciously used. One could say that this trivial attack could be
defeated by classical non-transferability techniques like having a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) for verifiers [2,11,15,16]. However, this would work only if the prover is
convinced that the verifier possesses himself a secret key. A trusted agent could still be
maliciously used to register a key whose secret part would be ignored by the verifier.
Later, the agent could prove that the verifier must ignore the secret key and continue to
defeat non-transferability. Finally, the only key registration model which could fix this
would imply some kind of key escrow: some information making the registrating au-
thority able to impersonate the verifier would eventually have to leak in order to thwart
the previous attack. Key escrow however leads us to other privacy concerns.
Another possible use of registering a public key whose secret component is sealed
in a trusted tamper-proof hardware would be to break anonymity in group signatures or
ring signatures [23]. Interestingly, it makes it possible to prove ignorance. It could also
be used in voting systems and open the door to vote selling.
While it is debatable if the trusted agent model is realizable or not, assuming it
cannot be used by adversaries is a much greater error than assuming that it can. For this
reason, we believe that cryptographers should mind the proposed trusted agent model
when designing future protocols.
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Related work. Classical ZK proof systems fulfill a privacy property called deniabil-
ity [21] stating that the verifier cannot prove knowledge to a third party after interact-
ing with the prover. That is, the verifier cannot transfer the proof upon completion.
The more general concept of non-transferability is also central in some cryptographic
schemes, such as invisible signatures [6]3 that use interactive verification in order to
prevent the signature to be authenticated to an unauthorized third party. A different way
to enforce deniability of a signature is to use a group or ring signature [23] between the
signing party and the verifier. In this case, the signer can deny the signature by claiming
that it was computed by the other party.
Several flaws have been found to non-transferability protocols, and improvements
have been proposed (see e.g. [2,11,15,16]). The attacks are focused in adversaries that
are online with the verifier during the interaction period. For offline attacks, it is ac-
cepted that the protocols are secure. However, herein we will present an offline attack
that will render several non-transferability protocols useless under the assumption that
the participants can trust tamper-proof devices.
The idea of using tamper-proof hardware to transfer proofs of ZK protocols was
first introduced in the context of quantum memory [18,19].
In general, setup phases in cryptographic protocols is a critical issue. Participants
are often assumed to securely register their public keys, although doing so is not trivial.
Key setup is a problem for the Universal Composability (UC) framework by Canetti [3].
For instance, the key registration model by Barak, Canetti, Nielsen and Pass [1] as-
sumes that the secret key of honest participants is safely stored by the key registration
authority. In [22], Ristenpart and Yilek considered several variants of key registration
protocols and have shown tricky interference with the security in several group signa-
ture protocols. They noticed that security proofs often assume that all participants send
their secret keys to a trusted authority in a KOSK model (as for Knowledge Of Secret
Key) although some signature schemes could still be secure in a less demanding key
registration process such as producing a self-signed certificate for the public key, what
they call the POP (as for Proof Of Possession). Our results show that POP is either not
enough in the trusted agent model, or compromises some other cryptographic property.
Katz [17] used another approach consisting in assuming the existence of tamper-
proof hardware tokens. These tokens could be used to achieve commitment, thus any
well-formed functionality. Contrarily to these hardware tokens, we assume that trusted
agents are private (namely: their holders do not give them to another user) and display
the initial code (or its digest) so that any other party can trust that it is in a state which is
a consequence of having set it up with this code. The question whether a tamper-proof
hardware can be trusted to run what it is supposed to is discussed e.g. in [14].
In [21], Pass introduced the notion of deniable zero-knowledge which is immune
to offline proof transfer. ZK in the standard model is essentially deniable. However,
zero-knowledge in the common reference string (CRS) model is not always deniable.
3 As suggested by several authors, we use the term of invisible signature to designate what is
more often called undeniable signature since the term undeniable is a little confusing, espe-
cially when we introduce the notion of deniability.
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Structure of the paper. The paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 we introduce the
trusted agent model and the nested trusted agent model. In Section 3 we study denia-
bility. We show that deniability is impossible if honest participants do not use trusted
agents but the malicious verifier does. We show that deniability is possible when the
prover uses trusted agents. In other cases, it is impossible in the nested trusted agent
model, and possible in the trusted agent model. Section 4 studies a key registration
model. It shows that key registration with key escrow makes non-transferability possi-
ble. We provide examples of malicious use of trusted agents in Section 5. Finally, we
draw some conclusions in Section 6.
2 The Trusted Agent Model
Multiparty computation model. In a multiparty setting, several participants or function-
alities4 run different algorithms and can communicate using pairwise communication
channels. Channels are assumed to be secure in the sense that leakage or corruption
in transmitted messages can only be made by one of the two end participants on this
channel. We consider a static adversarial model in which participants are either honest
or corrupted. Honest participants run predefined algorithms whereas corrupted partici-
pants may run arbitrary algorithms and talk to an (imaginary) adversary to collude. We
use calligraphic characters (e.g., PV or FTA) to denote participants and functionalities
and capital characters (e.g., V or M) to denote the algorithms they run. By convention
we will denote with a star ∗ the corrupted participants in a static model. Sometimes, a
participant P invoking a functionality O will be referred to P querying an oracle O and
we will write P O for this type of communication. Later, a trusted agent will be defined
by a functionality and used as an oracle. At the beginning, an arbitrary environment E
sends input to all participants (including the adversary and functionalities) and collect
the output at the end.
We stress that we do not necessarily assume that malicious participants have the
same privileges as honest participants, which means that they can have access to differ-
ent sets of functionalities. For instance, a malicious participant may use a trusted agent
as a tool for cheating while we would not want a honest one to need an extra device.
Recall that an interactive machine is a next-message deterministic function applied
to a current view. The view of the algorithm is a list containing all inputs to the machine
(including the random coins) and all messages which have been received by the machine
(with a reference to the communication channel through which it was delivered so that
they can see which ones come from a trusted agent). The view is time dependent and
can always be expanded by adding more messages.
We denote by P ↔ V two interactive algorithms P and V interacting with each
other, following a given protocol. When there is a single message sent by e.g. P to V ,
we say that the protocol is non-interactive and we denote it by P → V . If OP (resp.
OV ) is the list of functionalities that participant PP (resp. PV ) may invoke when running
the algorithm P (resp. V ) we denote by POP ↔ V OV the interaction. More precisely,
we denote by POP(rOP)(xP;rP)↔ V OV (rOV )(xV ;rV ) the experiment of running P with
4 Following the traditional terminology of universal composability [3], a functionality is a virtual
participant performing honestly a specific cryptographic task.
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input xP and random coins rP with access to OP initialized with random coins rOP and
interacting with V with input xV and random coins rV with access to OV initialized with
random coins rOV . We denote by ViewV (POP(rOP)(xP;rP)↔ V OV (rOV )(xV ;rV )) the final
view of V in this experiment, i.e. xV , rV and the list of messages from either P or OV .
The trusted agent model. We assume that it is possible to construct a trusted device
(agent) that runs honestly a known program (a minimal boot loader) in a secure en-
vironment (tamper proof) without any way of running another program. Moreover we
assume that the device’s memory is private, and that the only way to interact with the
device is by using the interface defined by the program. A device is attached to a par-
ticipant called its holder. He entirely controls the communication with it. The holder
may however show the display of the device to another participant which would give
him some kind of evidence of the outcome produced by a trusted agent. Below, we
model trusted agents in a similar way as Katz’s secure tokens [17]. Differences will be
discussed in the full version of the paper.
We consider (probabilistic) interactive Turing machines with four kinds of tapes:
the input tape, the working tape, the output tape, and the random tape. We define their
state by the state of the automaton and the content of the working tape. We consider
a programming language to specify the code of the transition function of the Turing
machine and its initial state. All trusted agents are modeled by a functionality FTA. To
access to a particular trusted agent, we use a sid value. For each used sid, FTA stores
a tuple in memory of form (sid,P ,r,C,state,out), where P identifies the holder of the
trusted agent, r denotes its random tape, C the loaded code to be displayed, state its
current state, and out its output tape. FTA treats the following queries.
Query SEND(sid,m) from participant P : If there is a tuple (sid,P ′, . . .) registered
with a participant P ′ 6= P , ignore the query. Otherwise:
– If there is a tuple with correct participant, parse it to (sid,P ,r,C,state,out) and
set in to the value of m.
– If there is no tuple registered, interpret m as a code C. Extract from it the value
state of its initial state. Then set in and out to the empty string. Pick a string r of
polynomial length at random. Then, store a new tuple (sid,P ,r,C,state,out).
Then, define a Turing machine with code C and initial state state, random tape set
to r, input tape set to in, and output tape set to out. Then, reset all head positions
and run the machine until it stops, and at most a polynomial number of steps. Set
state to the new state value, set out to the content of the output tape, and update the
stored tuple with the new values of state and out.
Note that the registered (sid,P ,r,C) are defined by the first query and never changed.
Query SHOWTO(sid,P ′) from participant P : If there is no tuple of form (sid,P ,
r,C,state,out) with the correct (sid,P ), ignore. Otherwise, send to P ′ the pair
formed by the code C and the content out.
Here, the holder P asks for the creation of a new trusted agent by invoking a fresh
instance sid of the functionality which becomes an agent. The holder is the only par-
ticipant who can send messages to the agent. The holder can define to whom to send
response messages by the SHOWTO message. (Incidentally, the holder can ask to see
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the output message himself.) The response message (as displayed on the device) con-
sists of the originally loaded code C and the current output out. Since the channel from
FTA to P ′ is secure, P ′ is ensured that some instance of FTA (i.e. some trusted agent)
was run with code C and produced the result out. Showing a trusted agent may pro-
vide a simple way to authenticate some data. By convention, we denote by [C : out]
an incoming message from FTA composed by a code C and a value out. The action of
checking [C : out] means that the receiver checks that it comes form FTA, that C matches
the expected code, and that out matches the expected pattern from the context.
One important property of this functionality is that it is well-formed. We say that a
list of oracles O is well-formed if for any pair (P0,P1) of participants and any algorithm
M with access to O, there exists an algorithm S with access to O such that the two
following experiments are indistinguishable from the environment:
1. P0 runs MO and P1 runs an algorithm doing nothing.
2. P0 runs and algorithm defined by
– for any incoming message m from P 6= P1, P0 sends [P ,m] to P1;
– for any incoming message [P ,m] from P1, P0 sends m to P ;
– upon message [out,m] from P1, the algorithm ends with output out.
The participant P1 runs SO .
Typically, S emulates the algorithm M by treating all messages forwarded by P0 and by
using P0 as a router. This means that the output of O is not modified if the algorithm M
is run by P0 or by P1. Informally, being well-formed means that the distribution of roles
among the participants does not affect the behavior of O. An example of a functionality
for which this is not the case is a key registration functionality who registers the name
of the sending participant and reports it to a directory. So, the adversary could check
if the key was registered by P0 or by P1 and tell it to the environment. As for FTA, it
checks that messages come from the same holder but his identity has no influence.
Relevance of the model in practice. Our model for trusted agent could easily be imple-
mented (assuming that tamper-resistance can be achieved) provided that we could trust a
manufacturer and that nobody could counterfeit devices. Obviously this is a quite strong
assumption but this could make sense in applications where there is a liable entity which
must be trusted. For instance, digital payment relies on trusted agents issued by a liable
bank: credit cards have a tamper-proof embedded chips and e-banking is often based
on trusted secure tokens such as secureID. Nation-wide e-governance could be based
on protocols using trusted agents. It is already the case for passports, ID documents, or
health cards with tamper-proof RFID chips. In this paper, we demonstrate that such de-
vices can be used for malicious reasons and not only to protect the user against attacks.
We show in Appendix A that our trusted agent model can perform bit commitment.
Following Katz’s reasoning [17], since we can realize commitments in the FTA-hybrid
model we can also realize many protocols which suffer from being impossible to realize
in the bare model. Namely, we can realize any well-formed functionality [5].
Nested trusted agents. Regular trusted agents run Turing machines which cannot in-
teract with other functionalities during their computation time. We can consider more
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general trusted agents who can use external oracles. Typically, we will consider gener-
alized trusted agents (which we call nested trusted agents) who can become the holder
of another trusted agents. To take an example, a (human) holder may communicate with
a trusted agent “of depth 2” modeled by the functionality F 2TA. The participant may then
receive [C : out] messages from F 2TA (if the holder asked to) or from the functionality
F 1TA of regular trusted agents (upon the request by the nested trusted agent).
Formally, if O is a list of functionalities, we consider the functionality F OTA which
looks like FTA with the difference that the running code C can now send messages to
all functionalities in O. Note that if O = ⊥ this means that no oracle is used and then,
F OTA is the regular FTA functionality. When O designates a trusted agent functionality,
we assume that F OTA keeps a record of which instance sid of F OTA queries which instance
sid′ of O so that only the holder device F OTA(sid) can communicate to a designated
trusted agent O(sid′), just like for human holders. Equivalently, we can say that F OTA
works by cloning itself in clones F OTA(sid).
We define F 0TA=⊥ (this is a dummy functionality doing nothing) and F nTA=F
F n−1TA
TA
iteratively. We have F 1TA = FTA. We further define FNTA = F
FNTA
TA . That is, instances
of FNTA can invoke FNTA. We obtain a hierarchy of functionalities starting with ⊥ and
FTA and ending with FNTA. To simplify, we consider F nTA as a restricted usage of FNTA
for all n. That is, holders load nested trusted agents with codes which are clearly made
for an agent of a given depth. A participant receiving a message [C : out] from FNTA
can see that it is from a trusted agent of depth bounded by n.
3 Forensic Attacks Based on a Trusted Witness (Deniability Loss)
We recall here the definitions of a hard predicate and a zero-knowledge argument of
knowledge system [12,13]. We slightly adapt it so that the prover and the verifier can
talk to a specific list of oracles (typically: trusted agents). If a list is specified as ⊥ or
unspecified, we consider that no oracle is used. Quite importantly, we do not necessarily
assume that honest and malicious verifiers have access to the same oracles.
Definition 1 (Hard predicate). Let R(x,w) be a predicate relative to a statement x
and a witness w. We say that R is a hard predicate if (1) there is a polynomial-time
Turing machine A such that A(x;w) yields 1 if and only if R(x,w) and (2) there is no
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine B such that for any x, B(x;r) returns w
such that R(x,w) with non-negligible probability (over the random coins r).
Definition 2 (Zero-knowledge argument). Let R(x,w) be a predicate relative to a
statement x and a witness w, OP,OV ,O∗V be three lists of oracles initialized using a
list of random coins rI . An argument of knowledge for R relative to (OP,OV ) is a
pair (POP ,V OV ) of polynomial-time interactive machines POP(x,w;rP) and V OV (x,z;rV )
such that: x is a common input; P has a secret input w; V has an auxiliary input z and
produces a binary output (accept or reject); and, moreover, the system fulfills the fol-
lowing properties:
– Completeness: for any rI ,rP,rV ,x,w,z such that R(x,w) holds, the outcome of in-
teraction POP(x,w;rP)↔V OV (x,z;rV ) makes V accept.
7
– Soundness: there exists a polynomial-time algorithm E (called extractor) which is
given full black-box access5 to the prover such that for any x and z, any polynomial-
time algorithm P∗ with access to OP, if the probability (over all random coins)
that P∗OP(x;rP)↔ V OV (x,z;rV ) makes V accept is non-negligible, then EP∗(x;r)
produces w such that R(x,w) with non-negligible probability (over r).
The argument system is called zero-knowledge (ZK) relative to O∗V (or O∗V -ZK) if for
any polynomial-time algorithm V ∗O∗V with access to O∗V there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm SO∗V (called simulator), which could be run by the verifier, such that for any x,
w, and z such that R(x,w), the experiments of either computing ViewV (POP(x,w;rP)↔
V ∗O
∗
V (x,z;rV )) or running SO
∗
V (x,z;r) produce two random (over all random coins) out-
puts with indistinguishable distributions.
As shown by the following classical lemma, our definition of zero-knowledge is essen-
tially deniable because the simulator can be run by the verifier [21]. This means that V ∗
cannot produce some y which could serve to feed a malicious prover P∗.6
Lemma 3. Let (POP ,V OV ) be an argument of knowledge system for R. The system is
O∗V -ZK if and only if for any polynomial-time algorithm V ∗O
∗
V producing a final out-
put y, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm SO∗V which could be run by the ver-
ifier such that for any x, w and z such that R(x,w), the experiments of either running
POP(x,w;rP)↔V ∗O∗V (x,z;rV ) and getting the final output y of V ∗ or running SO∗V (x,z;r)
produce two random outputs with indistinguishable distributions.
In the next lemma, we show that if the honest verifier has access to OV , a malicious
verifier V ∗ holding a nested trusted agent NOV can defeat deniability.
Lemma 4 (Transference Lemma). Let OP,OV be any oracle lists. We assume OV is
well-formed. Let NOV be a nested trusted agent with OV embedded. Let (POP ,V OV ) be an
argument of knowledge for R. We assume that V only receives messages from either OV
or the prover PP. There exists a non-interactive argument of knowledge (QOP,NOV ,W )
for R and a malicious verifier V ∗NOV producing a final string y such that the random
variables
ViewW
(
POP(x,w;rP)↔V ∗N
OV (x;rV )→W (x;rW )
)
and
ViewW
(
QOP,NOV (x,w;rP)→W (x;rW )
)
are indistinguishable.
Proof. We define a code C implementing the algorithm V OV to be run by NOV . The code
terminates the protocol by yielding either “x accepted” or “abort”.
5 This means that E can call P∗ as a subroutine, choose all inputs including the random tape (i.e.
it has “rewindable access”), see all outputs including queries to the oracles invoked by P∗ and
simulate their responses.
6 This notion of deniability is sometimes called self-simulatability [1] to avoid confusion with
other notions of deniability which are used in encryption or signature.
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To construct QOP,NOV , we first load NOV with the same C. Then, we simulate the
protocol between POP and NOV . Finally, Q sends SHOWTO PW where PW is the partic-
ipant running W . To define W , we just make it check that the message is [C : x accepted]
with the correct C and x and that the message comes from a trusted agent. Clearly,
(QOP,NOV ,W ) is an argument of knowledge for R: it is complete, and for soundness we
observe that if W accepts, then it must have received [C : x accepted] from a trusted
agent who thus must have run the code C and complete the proof verification. This
means that from the malicious Q∗OP,NOV interacting with NOV we can first extract an
algorithm P∗OP to complete the proof with V OV and then extract a witness.
To construct V ∗N , we simply let V ∗ load NOV with C and relay messages between
POP and NOV . Finally, V ∗ sends SHOWTO PW . Clearly, ViewW (POP ↔V ∗N ↔W ) and
ViewW (QOP,N ↔W ) are identically distributed. uunionsq
For OV =⊥, this result tells us that we can make any argument of knowledge non-
interactive by using a trusted agent. In other words, a malicious verifier V ∗ equipped
with a trusted agent O, after interacting with the prover P, can behave as a prover Q to
transfer non-interactively the argument of knowledge to any verifier W offline. This is
done by simply certifying a correct execution of V by O. Clearly, trusted agents make
the whole notion of NIZK pretty simple to achieve. This further leads us to making
deniable zero-knowledge collapse.
Theorem 5. Let OP,OV be any oracle lists. We assume OV is well-formed. Let NOV be
a nested trusted agent with OV embedded. Let R be any hard predicate. No argument of
knowledge (POP ,V OV ) for R such that V only receives messages from OV or the prover
PP is NOV -ZK.
In particular, if O is a trusted agent, no (P,V ) argument for R is O-ZK. In clear, if a ma-
licious verifier can use a trusted agent but the honest participants do not, the argument
system is not zero-knowledge.
Proof. Let (POP ,V OV ) be a NOV -ZK argument of knowledge for a relation R such that
V only receives messages from OV or the prover PP. We define V ∗,Q,W by Lemma 4.
Due to Lemma 3, there must exist a simulator SNOV making a string y without interact-
ing with POP . This string is indistinguishable from the one generated by V ∗N after the
interaction with POP , so it must be accepted by W . Since (QOP,NOV ,W ) is an argument
of knowledge for R, we can use an extractor on SNOV to get a witness w for x. This
contradicts that R is hard. uunionsq
Our result shows the inadequacy of deniable zero-knowledge as soon as adversaries
can use trusted agents. It does not mean that deniable zero-knowledge is impossible
in this model since honest participants could also use trusted agents to protect against
transference attacks.
Indeed, if the prover uses a trusted agent which can directly send messages to the
verifier (which is excluded in the hypothesis of Theorem 5), then it is possible to realize
deniable zero-knowledge as depicted in Figure 1.7 The code C makes FTA waits for
7 More formally: we can realize, in the sense of the universal composability framework, a zero-
knowledge functionality FZK in the FTA-hybrid model.
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Trusted Agent Prover Verifier
witness: w common: 1λ,x aux.: z
C←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b = R(x,w) x,w←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
output (b,x) [C:b,x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (SHOWTO PV ) [C:b,x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check trusted agent
check C,x and b = 1
Fig. 1. UC-realization of the FZK in the FTA-hybrid model.
(x,w), computes b = R(x,w), and outputs (b,x). Clearly, for this protocol to work it is
essential that in the last step, the message [C : b,x] reaches V from the prover’s TA via an
authenticated channel. The protocol is sound, because if the TA yields [C : 1,x], it must
be the case that it received w such that R(x,w) = 1 and the extractor can see messages
from P to it. Moreover, it is deniable, because ViewV (PFTA(x,w;rP)↔ V ∗(x,z;rV )) =
〈x,z,rV ,FTA : [C : 1,x]〉 and this string could be forged from x,z,rV by the verifier run-
ning S(x,z;rV ).
If the prover uses no oracle, the situation is more complicated. Actually, in the asym-
metric case where the verifier uses a nested trusted agent of depth n but the malicious
verifier uses a nested trusted agent of higher depth, no zero-knowledge is feasible due
to Th. 5. Note that the attack in Th. 5 requires an oracle NOV for V ∗ with higher depth
than OV for V . In fact, in symmetric cases where both verifiers use a nested TA F nTA
with same depth n, zero-knowledge is possible.8 In symmetric cases where verifiers use
FNTA (i.e. nested trusted agents of unbounded depth), no zero-knowledge is possible
since F FNTATA = FNTA. Feasible ZK results are summarized in the following table.
oracle for P oracle for V oracle for V ∗ feasibility comment
none none none yes classical situation
none F nTA F nTA yes
none F nTA F
n+1
TA no Th. 5
none FNTA FNTA no Th. 5
FTA any any yes Fig. 1, V receives messages
from the prover’s TA
4 Attacks Based on Public Key Registration Shift
ZK protocols have the property that a verifier cannot simulate a prover after completion
of the attack. Nevertheless, the verifier could still play the Mafia fraud attack [9]. In-
deed, if a third party, say Eve, and the verifier V ∗ are online, V ∗ may just relay messages
8 We can show this by having V make a commitment (using a TA) to a random challenge prior
to a Σ-protocol so that we transform a honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol into a full zero-
knowledge one.
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between the prover and Eve while Eve may play a role of a honest verifier. This type
of attack is addressed by a stronger notion of non-transferability. More concretely, we
define non-transferability based on [20].
Definition 6. Let OP,OV ,O∗V ,O∗W be some lists of oracles. Let (POP ,V OV ) be an inter-
active argument of knowledge for a relation R in the key registration model. We as-
sume that the verifier PV is designated by a reference given as an extra common input.
We say that the argument is non-transferable relative to O∗V |O∗W if, for any malicious
(polynomial-time) verifier V ∗O∗V run by PV , and any polynomial-time W ∗O∗W interacting
with V ∗ and not run by PV , there exists a simulator SO
∗
V run by PV such that for any x,
w and z such that R(x,w) the random variables (over all random coins)
ViewW ∗(POP(x,PV ,w;rP)↔V ∗O
∗
V (x,PV ,z;rV )↔W ∗O
∗
W (x;rW ))
and ViewW ∗(SO
∗
V (x,z;r)↔W ∗O∗W (x;rW )) are indistinguishable.
Thanks to Lemma 3, by using a dummy W ∗ receiving a single message y and do-
ing nothing else we can see that for any O∗W , non-transferability relative to O∗V |O∗W
implies O∗V -zero-knowledge. Hence, non-transferability is a stronger notion than zero-
knowledge (thus deniability).
Interestingly, the protocol of Fig. 1 using no key registration is non-transferable
since for any V ∗ we can simulate the fact that the algorithm receives the string [C : 1,x]
without the help of the prover. But maybe this is not the ideal non-transferable protocol
that we want to use because it requires a secure channel from the prover’s TA to the
verifier. So, in what follows we assume that the prover uses no trusted agent.
A classical technique to achieve such a strong non-transferability uses proofs to
a designated verifier V . This verifier is designated by its public key. That is, the ver-
ifier holds a public/private key pair (k,s). One way to make interactive proofs non-
transferable consists of replacing the proof of knowledge for secret w by a proof of
knowledge of either w or s. This way, a malicious verifier trying to transfer the proof
to someone else will not prove knowledge of w since the verifier is assumed to hold s.
This works because the verifier is not able to deny knowing s.
Practically, non-transferability strongly relies on the key setup assumption. To for-
malize this, we use a key registration model. If P wants to register a public key k, he
runs the (Reg,Dir) registration protocol with the registration authority. We model the
key registration authority by a new functionality F DirCA which registers (P ,k) in a direc-
tory. We assume that this functionality is first set up with coins rD. An instance of the
functionality is referred to by sid.
Query REGISTER(sid) from P : launch a Dir protocol session to interact with P . If an
output k is produced, store (P ,k). Ignore any further REGISTER(sid) query.
Query CHECK(sid,P ,k) from P ′: if (P ,k) is stored, sends (sid,yes) to P ′. Otherwise
sends (sid,no) to P ′.
In [22], Ristenpart and Yilek define several key registration models. They consider an
arbitrary key registration protocol (Reg,Dir) in which Reg(k,s;rR) is run by any reg-
istrant participant P with secret key s willing to register a public key k (e.g. generated
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by some algorithm G) and Dir(rD) is run by a certificate authority which is assumed to
be trusted. Several examples of key registration protocols are defined in [22]. The Plain
protocol simply consists of sending a public key from Reg to Dir. The Kosk protocol
(as for Knowledge Of Secret Key) consists of sending a public key joined with the secret
key from Reg to Dir so that the directory authority can check that the registrant knows
a secret key consistent with the registered public key. This quite strong model has a
brother protocol consisting of making the authority generate the key pair and sending it
to the registrant. This protocol is called KRK as for Key Registration with Knowledge in
[1]. This is the model that could be used when discussing about identity-based protocols
because of their intrinsic escrow property. The SPop protocol (as for Signature-based
Proof of Possession) consists of sending a public key as a self-signed certificate. The
Dir protocol first checks the signature before accepting the public key. This is indeed
what is used in many practical cases to register a key in a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). However, the SPop protocol is a pretty weak proof of possession while the Kosk
protocol leads to important privacy concerns due to key escrow. We enrich this list with
a ZKPop protocol which is an arbitrary zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the
secret key attached to the public key.
Our point is that if proving ignorance of s is doable for V ∗ then the transference
attack could still apply with this construction. More formally, in a protocol where V
receives messages from the prover and OV only, with O∗W = OV , if V ∗ acts as a relay
between the prover and W ∗ and is able to register a public key generated by W ∗ without
knowing the secret key, then V ∗ literally transfers the proof to W ∗. We have thus to
check which registration model makes it possible for V ∗ to register a public key k while
being able to prove ignorance of the secret key s. This is clearly the case of the Plain
and ZKPop models: since V ∗ and W ∗ are colluding, V ∗ can just relay messages between
the registering authority and W ∗ and learns nothing about s. In the SPop model (where
V ∗ acting the same would have to learn more than the public key to register), we have to
assume that a self-signed certificate does not provide any extra information to simulate a
malicious prover to show that the proof is transfered. On the other side, this is clearly not
the case of protocols based on key escrow such as the Kosk or KRK models. Indeed, key
escrow surprisingly helps privacy by restoring non-transferability in the trusted agent
model.
Theorem 7. Let O∗V ,O∗W be two lists of oracles. In the key registration model using
Kosk there exists some argument of knowledge (P,V F DirCA ) which is non-transferable
relative to O∗V |O∗W .
Consequently, (P,V F DirCA ) is a O∗V -ZK even when O∗V includes trusted agents.
Proof. We use a Σ protocol defined by four algorithms P1(x,w;rP) = (a, t), P2(t,e) = z,
Extract(x,a,e,z,e′,z′) = w, and Simulate(x,e;r) = (a,z), a bitlength `(λ) defining the
domain for e, and a polynomially computable predicate V0(x,a,e,z). Following [7], the
Σ protocol P(x,w;rP)↔V (x;rV ) works as follows: the prover runs P1(x,w;rP) = (a, t)
and sends a to V ; The verifier picks a random bitstring e of `(λ) bits and sends it to
P; The prover runs P2(t,e) = z and sends z to V ; The verifier accepts if and only if
V0(x,a,e,z) holds. Following the definition of Σ-protocols, the verifier always accept
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Prover Verifier
private witness: w common input: 1λ,x,PV auxiliary input: ε
random coins: rP = e2||r1||r2 random coins: rV = rs||rR||e
G(1λ;rs) = (kV ,sV )
REGISTER(sid)
CHECK(sid,PV ,kV )
sid,kV←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Reg(kV ,sV ;rR)
if answers no, abort
P1(x,w;r1) = (a1, t)
Simulate(kV ,e2;r2) = (a2,z2)
a1,a2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
e1 = e⊕ e2, P2(t,e1) = z1 e1,z1,e2,z2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check V0(x,a1,e1,z1)
check V0(kV ,a2,e2,z2)
check e1⊕ e2 = e
Fig. 2. A non-transferable ZK proof system.
if R(x,w) holds and the protocol is correctly executed; Extract(x,a,e,z,e′,z′) must re-
turns a witness w′ such that R(x,w′) whenever the conditions e 6= e′, V0(x,a,e,z), and
V0(x,a,e′,z′) are satisfied (this is the special soundness property); and for any x and e,
Simulate(x,e;r) = (a,z) should define a random (a,e,z) triplet such that V0(x,a,e,z)
holds with same distribution as the triplets generated by the honest run of the protocol
(this is the special zero-knowledge property).
We modify the protocol of [8] as depicted on Fig. 2. Relative to the Kosk key reg-
istration model, obtain a non-transferable argument of knowledge. If V ∗ does not send
any valid kV binded to PV to P, the simulation is trivial since it does not use w. Other-
wise, V ∗ must have sent some kV together with sV to F DirCA . A simulator for V ∗ could
then use sV to simulate P in the OR proof. uunionsq
In this construction based on key escrow, the registering authority could abuse the
protocol and make a cheating prover to the designated verifier. We further show that
this (bad) property is necessary for any (P,V F DirCA ) protocol which is non-transferable.
Theorem 8. Let OP,OV be two lists of oracles. We assume that OV is well-formed and
that PV can only receive messages from either OV , F DirCA , or PP. Let PD be an authority
who runs an emulator D for the F DirCA functionality for a given protocol (Reg,Dir). Let
(POP ,V OV ,F DirCA ) be an argument of knowledge for R which is non-transferable relative to
⊥ |OV . We let ˜V OV (x,PV ,z;rV ) denote the protocol who simulates V OV F DirCA (x,PV ,z;rV )
with all messages for PD and PP sent to the same counterpart. There exists an algorithm
D∗OP(x,z;r) such that for any rI , x, z, D∗OP ↔ ˜V OP accepts with high probability.
This means that if an interactive proof using well-formed oracles for the verifier is non-
transferable and with the property that the registering authority cannot cheat with the
verifier, then the verifier PV must receive messages from an oracle OP, e.g. using a TA.
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Proof. We let W ∗OV = ˜V OV be run by a participant PW with PV as counterpart. Here,
V ∗ is “router” who “reroutes” the requests by W ∗ to the registration authority to PD
and others to PP. Clearly, POP ↔ V ∗F DirCA ↔W ∗OV makes W ∗ always accept since OV
is well-formed. Thanks to the definition of non-transferability, there is a simulator S
such that the view from W ∗ to either POP ↔ V ∗F DirCA ↔ W ∗OV or SF DirCA ↔ W ∗OV are
indistinguishable. We can thus define D∗ = SF DirCA so that D∗ ↔ ˜V accepts with high
probability. uunionsq
5 Malicious Applications
5.1 Shedding Light on Invisible Signatures (Invisibility Loss)
Undeniable signatures (aka invisible signatures) were invented by Chaum and van Antwer-
pen in [6] and have two basic features: (i) interactive verification, that is, the verifica-
tion process is interactive and so the signer can choose who can verify his signature; (ii)
disavowal protocol which allows the signer to prove that a given signature is a forgery.
The first feature enables the signer to restrict the verification of the signature to those he
wishes to. If the document leaks, a third party would not be able to verify the signature
alone.
More formally, an invisible signature scheme is defined by two algorithms and a
relation R: algorithm Setup(1λ;Ks) =Kp is making keys and algorithm Sign(m,Ks;r) =
s is making signatures. The relation R(x,w)with witness w=Ks defines valid signatures
x = (m,s,Kp). The scheme also comes with two ZK proof of knowledge protocols
(PConfirm(x,Ks;rP),VConfirm(x;rV )) and (PDeny(x,Ks;rP),VDeny(x;rV ))
for the relations R and ¬R, respectively. Besides the zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge properties, the scheme requires signature to be existentially unforgeable and invis-
ible. Several definitions for invisibility exist in the literature. The weakest one requires
the existence of a simulator S(m,Kp;r) = s that makes strings look like signatures, such
that no algorithm based on Kp only can distinguish between Sign and S. This does
not prevent from transferability issues. Clearly, a verifier V ∗ for (Confirm or Deny)
equipped with a trusted agent O could transfer a proof universally from Lemma 4 to
any offline W . Somehow, this malicious verifier would remove the “invisibility shield”
on the signature which would then become visible.
There are some invisible signature schemes featuring non-transferability proper-
ties [20]. They however require verifiers to be given public and privates keys as well.
We have seen how to defeat this protection in Section 4.
5.2 Selling Votes (Receipt-Freeness Loss)
Another application where transferring the protocol to a trusted agent would be dan-
gerous is for e-voting: clearly, a trusted agent casting a ballot on behalf of a malicious
elector could later testify the ballot content and receipt-freeness would be broken. E-
democracy could collapse due to corruption with the help of trusted agents.
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5.3 Denying Ring Signatures (Anonymity Loss)
Ring signatures were proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [23] to allow members
of a certain group to sign a message without conveying any information on who inside
the group signed the message. Informally, the ring signature works as follows. A signer
creates a “ring” of members including himself. Each ring member 1≤ i≤ n has a public
ki and secret key si. The public key specifies a trapdoor permutation and the secret key
specifies the trapdoor information needed to compute its inverse. The signing process
generates a ciphertext that could have been generated by anyone knowing at least one
secret key. The verification process only requires the knowledge of the public keys. This
way, the signer can hide in a ring that he created himself. Ring signature can be used
e.g. for whistleblowing in order to protect the signer. Ring signatures can be used as a
countermeasure to spamming. The idea is to have every email sent together with a ring
signature of a ring consisting of the sender P and the receiver V . The reason to have
email signed by the sender is to authenticate its origin and moreover, to make the email
somehow binding. The reason to have the receiver in the ring is to prevent him from
exhibiting the signed email to a third party W ∗. In such a case, the email could have
been forged by the receiver V ∗ so the sender can deny it.
If one member, say Victor, of the ring can prove the ignorance of his own secret
key, then he can show that he was not able to sign any message with the ring signature,
that is, he denies the signature. One way for Victor doing this in the Plain registration
model is to take some pseudorandom generator pi, some seed x and publish as public
key k = pi(x). In this way he could present the pseudorandom generator and the seed
to a third party W ∗ and convince him that he was not able to use the ring signature,
since he did not know the secret key. To fix this, the key registration model should at
least mandate the use of a proof of possession of a secret key, e.g. using self-signed
certificates like the SPop or ZKPop protocol.
To defeat this, Victor owning a trusted agent could have his agent to simulate a
key registration process so that only the agent would know the secret key. The attack
could be more vicious here since the agent could still be used to sign messages in a
ring. The only difference is that the agent would keep record of all signed messages
and could, upon request, certify that a message was signed or not. The signature by the
trusted agent of the certificate together with its code is an evidence to anyone trusting
the agent.
In [22], Ristenpart and Yilek proved that ring signatures could guaranty anonymity
for rings larger than 2 even when the adversary can select the keys under the key reg-
istration model using an SPop protocol. Clearly, this result is no longer valid in the
trusted agent model.
Once again, the attack relies on the public key registration issue, and the only way
to thwart it seems to use key escrow: the Kosk protocols. This however enables the
registration authority to forge a ring signature with a ring consisting of honest P and V :
having V ’s secret key makes it possible to impersonate P to V . Finally, it seems that we
either have to choose between having signatures deniable or forgeable.
We could still fix this problem by making honest participants use trusted agents to
help registering keys in a Kosk-like model still ensuring privacy: a trusted agent could
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simulate Dir running Kosk. The certificate from the trusted agent could then be sent to
D to register. Again, this fix is void if malicious registrants use nested trusted agents.
6 Conclusions
We have defined the Trusted Agent Model. In the past, several cryptographic protocols
requiring trusted agents have been proposed but researchers prefer to develop protocols
without them. However it does not prevent to maliciously use such devices if they exist.
We devised scenarii in which adversaries equipped with such devices could defeat sev-
eral cryptographic properties, e.g. invisibility in invisible signatures, receipt-freeness in
e-voting, or anonymity in ring signatures. Fundamentally, these failures come from the
strange nature of deniability in protocols. We have shown that deniability is not pos-
sible for regular protocols (namely, protocols not using trusted agents) if adversaries
can use trusted agents. Deniability becomes possible again if honest and corrupted ver-
ifiers can use trusted agents. It collapses again if the malicious verifier can use a nested
trusted agent of depth higher than the one the honest verifier is using. It can be restored
again in a key registration model. We can even achieve non-transferability which is a
stronger form of deniability, but this comes at the price of key escrow: if a protocol
is non-transferable, then the key registration authority has the privilege to create mali-
cious provers. Namely, non-transferability requires giving the authority some piece of
information which could be used to cheat with proofs, which is pretty bad for privacy.
An ultimate solution consists of making the proving part trivial by having proofs (resp.
signatures) assessed by a trusted agent instead of running a protocol with the prover.
Although our “attacks” are pretty trivial, we think the issue of malicious use of
trusted devices in practice has been overlooked so far. Clearly, these devices could de-
feat some privacy protocols. To the authors it does not seem acceptable on one hand, to
accept tamper-proof hardware, and on the other hand, assume that adversaries cannot
use such hardware and its properties to perform attacks.
Probably, the most interesting question that this paper opens is whether privacy is
a self-contradicting concept or not. As shown herein, as soon as we place boundaries
around devices, we can no longer control how private data spreads, so boundaries are
somehow harming privacy. On the other hand, privacy strongly relies on setting bound-
aries on data.
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A Secure Commitment Using Trusted Agents
We consider the Fcom functionality9 defined by
Query COMMIT(sid,P ,P ′,b) from P : record b, send the message [receipt,sid,P ,P ′]
to P ′, and ignore any future COMMIT queries.
Query OPEN(sid) from P : if no value b was recorded, ignore. Otherwise, send [open,sid,b]
to P ′.
Here is a protocol to realize this ideal functionality using trusted agents:
– To emulate COMMIT(sid,P ,P ′,b) by P , participant P sets a code C as detailed be-
low, makes the queries SEND(sid,C) to FTA, then SEND(sid,b), then SHOWTO(sid,P ′).
Participant P ′ gets a message [C : receipt,N], checks that it comes from FTA, that
C is correct (as defined below), and stores N.
– To emulateOPEN(sid), P queries SEND(sid, /0) to FTA and finally SHOWTO(sid,P ′).
Participant P ′ gets a message [C : open,N′,b′], checks that it comes from FTA, that
C is still correct, and that N = N′. The value b′ is revealed.
The code C takes a first message b as input, picks a random nonce N, stores N and
b, and responds by (receipt,N). Then it waits for a dummy message and responds by
(open,N,b).
Given a static adversary A interacting with P , P ′ and FTA in the real world, we
define a simulator S interacting with P , P ′ and FTA in the ideal world so that for any
environment E interacting with P , P ′ and A resp. S , the real and ideal views of E are
indistinguishable. Therefore, the protocol UC-realizes Fcom in the FTA-hybrid model.
Indeed, when P and P ′ are both honest or both corrupted, constructing the simulator
is trivial. When P is honest but P ′ is corrupted, the [C : receipt,N] message to P ′ can
be perfectly simulated from the [receipt,sid,P ,P ′] by picking a fresh nonce N and
maintain a table of sid↔ N pairs. The [C : open,N′,b′] message can be simulated upon
message [open,sid,b] from Fcom by looking up at the table for the correct N′ and setting
b′ = b. Thanks to the trusted agent property and the C code there must be an appropriate
pair. When P is corrupted and P ′ is honest, the messages to FTA with correct code C
can be perfectly simulated from the message COMMIT(sid,P ,P ′,b) resp. OPEN(sid)
to Fcom.
9 The functionality Fmcom [4] could be used as well.
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